Thoughts on the Churn Law by Halley, Michael
Copyright  2009  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  104 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review  Colloquy 
 132 
THOUGHTS ON THE CHURN LAW 
Michael Halley* 
INTRODUCTION 
A grand alliance is forming, and new trenches are being dug on the old 
and hallowed battleground of the Constitution.  Waving the stars and stripes 
of ―constitutional design,‖1 and richly equipping themselves with the wea-
ponry of reason, scholars like Richard Fallon, Sanford Levinson, and Jack 
Balkin have taken the field to determine ―what provisions for judicial re-
view (if any) ought to exist in constitutions for all societies whose people 
and legislatures are seriously committed to respecting rights,‖2 and to avoid-
ing ―constitutional crises‖ by ―careful planning.‖3  Fallon, a self-proclaimed 
―system-designer,‖ applauds himself for having ―plowed rich ground.‖4  
Levinson and Balkin claim to be revealing a ―secret‖5 that, if they are to be 
believed, has not only gone untold and unnoticed since the nation‘s Found-
ing, but could have avoided the near apocalypse of our Civil War.6 
Frederick Schauer‘s ambition—to breed a race of lawyers and judges 
equal to the ignominy of slavishly adhering to precedent—is no less breath-
taking.  Asserting that ―following precedents even when they seem wrong 
to the decision maker is . . . a large part of law,‖7 he proposes to conduct 
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  Fallon, supra note 1, at 1734. 
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  Levinson & Balkin, supra note 1, at 753. 
4
  Fallon, supra note 1, at 1733, 1734. 
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  Levinson & Balkin, supra note 1, at 714. 
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  Levinson and Balkin first classify President Buchanan‘s belief that ―the Constitution did not allow 
him to deal with the most urgent problem facing the nation,‖ id. at 731, as a crisis resulting from exces-
sive fidelity to the Constitution, id. at 729, and then maintain that such crises are ―the ones most likely to 
be avoided by careful planning,‖ id. at 753.  Levinson‘s and Balkin‘s suggestion that better planning 
could have avoided the Civil War ignores the fact that Congress, in enacting the Missouri Compromise, 
endeavored to do just that.  Whether, as Justice Scalia maintains, their plan would have succeeded had 
the Supreme Court not stuck its nose into the matter by declaring the act unconstitutional is a question 
whose answer the passage of time has foreclosed.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 1001–02 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (link). 
7
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legal training (or are selected for legal training)‖ are superior, before receiv-
ing that training, ―at subjugating their preferences for the right answer to a 
norm of precedent‖; (2) ―whether those who are trained in the constraints of 
precedent (recent graduates of law school, for example) are better at follow-
ing uncomfortable (to them) precedents than those who have yet to receive 
such training‖; and (3) ―whether those who self-select for judging, or who 
are selected to be judges, are better at following precedent than practicing 
lawyers of similar experience.‖8  Whether these scholars‘ wholesale em-
brace of intelligent design is the means to perfect constitutional systems 
commensurate with the universal call for freedom, or whether it desecrates 
the Founders‘ legacy of a constitutional frame attributable neither to ―hu-
man genius‖ nor to ―reason and reflection,‖ but only to ―time and expe-
rience,‖9 remains to be decided; and it can only be hoped that the tenor of 
the debate will prove less rancorous than the all-out war currently raging 
between the proponents of intelligent design and those of evolution in the 
field of biology. 
 
I. PRECEDENT V. ANALOGY 
What is precedent?  Assailing the ―erroneous conflation of constraint 
by precedent with reasoning by analogy,‖10 Schauer maintains that the ―ob-
ligation to follow earlier decisions just because of their existence and not 
because of their perceived correctness‖ is, at best, ―a counter-intuitive form 
of reasoning.‖11  Precedent provides a reason—and apparently a compelling 
one—to abstain from reasoning.  Schauer is insistent that precedent should 
not be understood as merely an ―application of reasoning by analogy.‖12  
Conceding that in the first instance arguments from precedent and by anal-
ogy both require a ―determination of relevant similarity,‖13 he is adamant 
that precedent and analogy are different in kind.  With precedent, ―the ques-
tion of relevant similarity admits only one plausible answer,‖ which may 
well foreclose the judge from making the decision she deems correct.14  
Analogy, on the other hand, allows for a ―choice‖ amongst competing simi-
larities.15  ―Once we see‖ that precedent forecloses ―choice . . . , we can un-
derstand the most dramatic difference between analogy and precedent.‖16  





  Id.  
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  Id. at 454. 
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  Id. at 455. 
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  Id.  
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  Id. at 457. 
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  Id. at 458. 
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precedent constrains us mechanically and unthinkingly ―to turn square cor-
ners.‖18   
So far so good.  But in attributing what he calls ―the Aristotelian 
mandate to treat like cases alike‖ (to do what has been done before even if 
we now think the past action was ―mistaken or ―misguided‖),19 Schauer 
conflates a practice of studied ignorance with what Chief Justice Roberts 
has repeatedly referred to and relied on as ―the basic principle of justice.‖20  
It is one thing for Schauer to take issue with the often-repeated claim of 
scientists that precedent and analogy are simply different applications of the 
same cognitive function,21 quite another to refute a Chief Justice—
empowered ―to say what the law is‖22—who also espouses this view.  Sure-
ly even his greatest critics cannot in good faith accuse the Chief Justice of 
conflating justice with the necessity of deciding cases by rote reliance on 
previous cases even where he believes those cases to have been wrongly 
decided.  Quite to the contrary.  The critics live in fear that he will vote to 
overturn Roe v. Wade,23 as he has already voted to overrule Michigan v. 
Jackson,24 en route to overruling Miranda v. Arizona.25  In determining to 
overrule Jackson‘s precedent ―forbidding police to initiate interrogation of a 
criminal defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or simi-
lar proceeding,‖26 Roberts and his like-minded brethren explained that the 
Court ―created . . . Jackson by analogy to a similar prophylactic rule estab-
lished [in Edwards v. Arizona27] to protect the Fifth Amendment based Mi-
randa right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.‖28  
Reconceiving the Jackson precedent as a mere analogy that was incorrectly 
drawn, they had no difficulty overruling it.  In doing so the Court further 





  Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (link). 
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  Schauer, supra note 7, at 458.  So far as I know, Aristotle never said any such thing.  The closest 
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ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1007 (Richard McKeon ed., 
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20
  Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (―[T]he basic principle of justice [is] 
that like cases should be decided alike.‖) (link). 
21
  Schauer, supra note 7, at 454. 
22
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (link). 
23
  410 U.S. 113 (1973) (link). 
24
  475 U.S. 625 (1986) (link). 
25
  384 U.S. 436 (1966) (link). 
26
  Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009) (link).  
27
  451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that once ―an accused has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, . . . [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available,‖ unless he initiates the contact) (link). 
28
  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (emphasis added). 
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analogy to Miranda.29  This brief synopsis evinces two practical realities at 
irreconcilable odds with Schauer‘s theoretical construct: first, that Chief 
Justice Roberts‘s ―basic principle‖ of likeness is one of analogy; and 
second, that the bright-line distinction Schauer would draw between analo-
gy and precedent is ephemeral.  That what Schauer understands as 
precedent can just as credibly be understood as analogy is confirmed by the 
Montejo Court‘s concluding remark: ―This case is an exemplar of Justice 
Jackson‘s oft quoted warning that this Court ‗is forever adding new stories 
to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collaps-
ing when one story too many is added.‘‖30  If this ―reasoning by analogy‖31 
holds; and crediting the implication behind the Court‘s assertion that ―today 
we remove Michigan v. Jackson’s  fourth story of prophylaxis,‖32 the foun-
dation on which it once firmly rested as unshakable precedent—Miranda as 
analogy to the Fifth Amendment33—will be next to go.   
Schauer‘s determination to contradict the Chief Justice and separate the 
wheat of analogy from the chaff of precedent is perhaps attributable to an 
overemphasis on the law‘s backward-facing aspect, which he describes as 
preoccupied with ―previous decisions and practices solely for the sake of 
consistency . . . .‖34  If this slavish adherence to ―prior decisions addressing 
the same issue regardless of . . . how the issue ought to be decided,‖ were as 
―ubiquitous‖ as Schauer claims,35 then precedent, in the sense of stare deci-
sis or of the dead hand, should be the rule and not the exception; and the 
expected result would not be the ever-swelling volume of appellate deci-
sions analogizing this to that, but rather a slim compendium, perhaps not 
much larger than the copy of the Constitution Justice Hugo Black famously 
kept in his breast pocket, or the twin tablets Moses retrieved from Sinai.  
In fact, the law is every bit as much forward looking as it is backward 
leaning.  The work of analogy accounts for this thrust.  If, as Aristotle says, 
time is forever ―different and different,‖36 precedent accounts for the part of 
it that has been, whereas analogy accounts for the part that is not yet. The 
confusion between precedent and analogy is symptomatic of this deeper 





  See id.  
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  Id. at 2092 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring)). 
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  Schauer, supra note 7, at 454. 
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  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092. 
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  Id. at at 2090. 
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  Schauer, supra note 7, at 455. 
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  Id.  
36
  ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 19, at 289. 
37
  EDMUND HUSSERL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNAL TIME CONSCIOUSNESS 21 (Martin Hei-
degger ed., James S. Churchill trans., 1964).  See SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS Book XI, Ch. XXII, 
in 18 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD: AUGUSTINE 95 (Edward Bouverie Pusey trans., 1952) 
(―My soul is on fire to know this most intricate enigma.‖). 
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gone.  Time‘s enigma, reports Husserl, nearly drove Augustine insane.38  
Heidegger complains that it ―has had every possible kind of effect ever 
since Aristotle.‖39  Time, he adds, ―remains‖ today as ―deceptive‖ as it was 
then.  According to Husserl, it ―is motionless and yet it flows.‖40  
The consequences of time are as polarizing and ultimately as unsatis-
factory for the law as they are for philosophy.  The perceived injustice of an 
ever elusive present is evidenced afresh in a doctrine of Article III standing 
that permits a long-barren woman to sue for the right to an abortion she 
once wanted, but no longer needs, because the circumstances are ―capable 
of repetition, yet evading review.‖41  In dissenting because the ―record in no 
way indicates the presence‖ of ―a plaintiff who was in her first trimester of 
pregnancy at some time during the pendency of her lawsuit,‖42 then-
Associate Justice William Rehnquist only reinforced what Holmes dis-
cerned long ago: there is inherent difficulty in ―transferring‖ a right ―when 
the situation of fact from which it sprung‖ is long gone.43  Whereas Rehn-
quist cannot see how an as yet unidentified women who may, one day, be-
come pregnant can step into the shoes of someone who once was—but is no 
longer—pregnant, Holmes maintains that it is just this kind of stepping into 
the shoes of that is one of the law‘s ―significant metaphor[s],‖44 and that it is 
ubiquitous. 
In what follows, I endeavor first to probe more particularly into how 
time functions in the law, and to suggest that time‘s forward movement, 
however apparently reasonable, leads to unreasonable results that can only 
be countered by the seemingly unreasonable stoppage of time.  I go on to 
suggest that this reversal of the roles of reason and non-reason is endemic to 
both the common law and constitutional law as we know and practice it in 
America.  Consequently, I argue further that Schauer‘s analysis of forward-
looking analogy as the friend of reason and backward-leaning precedent as 
reason‘s foe is symptomatic not of a difference between them, but rather of 
an underlying identity signaling that the two should be synthesized.  In this 
view, precedent is itself the voice of reason declaring in no uncertain terms: 
Thou shalt not reason.  I conclude by briefly returning to my introductory 
remarks, and arguing that the extant confusion over the rule of reason and 





  HUSSERL, supra note 37, at 21.  
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  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, SCHELLING‘S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM 76 (Joan 
Stambaugh trans., 1985) (1936). 
40
  HUSSERL, supra note 37, at 89. 
41
  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 
515 (1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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  See id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 409 (1881).  
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  Id. at 354. 
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the debate over intelligent design and evolution from biology to constitu-
tional law.45    
II. THE LAWS OF TIME 
The fee, Holmes explains, first establishes a ―fictitious identification‖ 
that transports the living presence of a persona forward into the future as 
heriditas;46 the fee goes on, he insists, to ―run[] through everything.‖47  The 
estate itself, that to which succession adheres, has nothing to do with land: 
―As every lawyer knows, the estate does not mean the land.  It means the 
status or persona in regard to that land formerly sustained by another.‖48  In 
the estate the other that was and the other that will be are the same.  The 
law effects the ―joinder‖ of past and future ―times‖ into one being.49  How 
else, Holmes inquires, can a law of prescription arrange for ten-year tres-
passes by different people to conjoin and establish one estate, one perso-
na?50  The mere fact that one person‘s wrong follows after another‘s cannot 
account for the joinder.51  As Holmes is quick to point out, ―if four strangers 
to each other used the way for five years each, no right would be acquired 
by the last.‖52  Rather, ―[t]he joinder of times is given to those who succeed 
to the place of another;‖53 only where the predecessor and the successor are 






  I investigate this subject more fully in an article entitled Constitutional Design or Evolution to 
appear shortly.  
46
  HOLMES, supra note 43, at 342, 351.  The heir is ―eudem persona cum antecessore, the same per-
sona as his ancestor.‖  Id. at 349. 
47
  Id. at 353.   As Holmes more fully explains:  
[T]he most striking instance . . . is the acquisition of prescriptive rights. . . .  A 
man uses a way for ten years and dies.  Then his heir uses it ten years.  Has any 
right been acquired‖ from these successive trespasses?  ―If common sense alone is 
consulted, the answer must be no. . . .  But here comes in the fiction . . . .  From 
the point of view of the law it is not two persons who have used they way for ten 
years each, but one who has used it for twenty.  The heir has the advantage of sus-
taining his ancestor‘s persona, and the right is acquired.  
Id.    
48
  Id. at 376. 
49
  Id. at 363.  See id. at 363–366.  
50
  See id. at 354.  
51
  See id. at 365. 
52
  Id. at 353. 
53
  Id. at 363. 
54
  Id. at 351.  Chaucer, the medieval poet, may have been the first to grasp the fee‘s transcendental 
aspect when he said, about the Sergeant of the Law, ―Al was fee symple to hym in effect.‖  GEOFFREY 
CHAUCER, THE TALES OF CANTERBURY 11 (Robert A. Pratt ed., Houghton Mifflin 1966) (1400) (Gener-
al Prologue, line 319).  Nietzsche, reflecting on the genius of America‘s greatest transcendentalist, picks 
up the trace when he says that Emerson ―is absolutely unaware of how old he already is and how young 
he will yet become; he could say of himself in Lope de Vega‘s words: ‗yo me sucedo a mi mismo‘ [I am 
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Holmes‘s ―analogies of the inheritance‖55 go further still.  He insists 
that ―without understanding the theory of inheritance, it is impossible to 
understand the theory of transfer inter vivos.‖56  Here, the first difficulty ―is 
to convince the s[k]eptic that there is anything to explain,‖ because ―[o]f 
course,‖ the skeptic says, ―a person has the right to sell the property he 
owns.‖57  But that was not always so self-evidently true.58  The now transpa-
rent connection between ―the notion that a right is valuable‖ and ―the notion 
that it may be turned into money by selling it‖ had to be established.59  As 
Holmes explains, ―[b]efore you can sell a right, you must be able to make a 
sale thinkable in legal terms,‖ and he cautions that ―[i]t is a great mistake to 
assume that it is a mere matter of common sense that the buyer steps into 
the shoes of the seller.‖60  This stepping into the shoes of had to be devised, 
and what allows for the sale of land is ―the obvious analogy between pur-
chaser and heir.‖61  
That this legal process of fast-forwarding into the future will—indeed 
must—go on ad infinitum if left to its own devices is confirmed by the fact 
that the persona, qua estate, qua hereditas perpetuates itself in the much 
celebrated and much reviled contingent future interest, which is legally 
binding notwithstanding the fact that no identifiable being exists or may ev-
er exist.  The contingent future interest depends on the emergence of a vir-
tual person—if, ten thousand years from now (or whenever) the qualifying 
person comes into being, he or she immediately steps into the conveyor‘s 
shoes as heir just as if no time had elapsed and nothing had happened in the 
interim. 
                                                                                                                           
my own heir].‖  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 50 (Duncan Large trans., 1998) (1895) 
(link). 
55
  HOLMES, supra note 43, at 365. 
56
  Id. at 353. 
57
  Id. at 354. 
58
  Id. at 354.  Nor is it always true today.  For all his sovereignty, the monarch is foreclosed from 
selling his realm.  The royal lands are inalienable.  They cannot be transferred in the ordinary course.  
Neither can the crown itself.  Although it is always exposed to being picked up off the field of battle by 
a conqueror, a crown cannot be bought and sold in the open market.  Monarchs ―do not have the same 
right as other citizens either to dispose freely of their entire property or to know that it will pass on to 
their children in proportion to the equal degree of love that they feel for them.‖  G.W.F. HEGEL, 
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 306, at 345 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991).  The monarch‘s ―wealth‖ is ―inalienable,‖ entailed, and ―burdened with pri-
mogeniture‖ in ways that would be unthinkable and intolerable for his subjects.  Id.  In accordance with 
his view that property is ―the existence [Dasein] of personality,‖ Hegel understands the modern constitu-
tion as the conversion ―without struggle or opposition‖ of the monarch‘s property into ―public property.‖  
Id. § 51, at 81, § 298, at 291.   
59
  HOLMES, supra note 43, at 354. 
60
  Id. at 353–54. 
61
  Id. at 355.  In fact, to Holmes, ―every relation of juridical succession presupposes either an inhe-
ritance or a relation to which, so far as it extends, the analogies of the inheritance may be applied.‖  Id. 
at 365.  
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The infinite contingent future interest is an extreme example of the fa-
miliar Latin cognate for the law‘s propensity to project forward, nunc pro 
tunc, and the law has had to employ strong counter-measures to arrest it.  
Why does ―the law abhor[]‖ a perpetuity62 if not because perpetuity bes-
peaks a future time we are not equipped to comprehend at present, or ever?  
A time machine thus hurtling us into the unknown willy-nilly must be dis-
abled, and so a wooden rule against perpetuities is devised63 that effectively 
stops even the most ingenious estate lawyer dead in his tracks: ―No interest 
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after 
some life in being at the creation of the interest.‖64   
The wooden rule against perpetuities is no aberration, however; rather, 
it reflects an endemic tendency that is universally perceived to be unaccept-
ably dangerous if left unchecked.  What else but an abiding fear that the law 
will get too far ahead in time explains the perceived need for the bluntly fa-
shioned statute of limitations?  Absent the imposition of a non-negotiable 
drop dead date, the law‘s future jurisdiction over a person‘s past is nothing 
short of infinite.  However time may seem to pass me by, and however 
much I may change and grow older, I remain the same juridically present 
person whom the law may rightly summon to appear and call to account.65  
The fact that a person may, generally, elect to exempt himself from this 
otherwise everlasting jurisdiction by raising a statute of limitations serves 
only to confirm the defense‘s artificiality—for to be successful, a statute of 
limitations defense must be affirmatively made, at the earliest possible mo-





  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *174.   
63
  The rule against perpetuities ―restricts the creation of contingent future interests.‖  L. M. Simes, 
Public Policy and the Dead Hand, reprinted in CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND 
LAW 471 (1977).  Although the rule itself arose around 1600, the problem it purports to address is far 
older: whether ―[t]he earth belongs always to the living generation,‖ id. at 472 (quoting Thomas Jeffer-
son), or to the ancients, or to ―Posterity,‖ as the preamble of our Constitution forthrightly declaims, is a 
question whose structure resembles the structure of time itself, and so far as philosophy is concerned 
neither Augustine, nor Aristotle, nor Hegel, nor Husserl, nor Heidegger has been able to answer it.   
64
  T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, reprinted in HAAR & LIEBMAN, 
supra note 63, at 452. The rule against perpetuities allows the dead hand, dead for twenty-one years, to 
literally control the devising of property. 
65
  Kant endeavors to explain just what makes this right:  
[W]hen what is in question is the law governing our intelligible existence . . . , 
reason acknowledges no distinctions concerning the time at which something oc-
curred, the only thing it enquires into being whether a certain act is attributable to 
me as my deed.  And if it is, it is one and the same sentiment which becomes in-
variably associated with it, no matter whether the deed is happening now or 
whether it happened in time long past. 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 122 (G. Heath King & Ronald Weitzman eds., 
H.W. Cassirer trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1998). 
66
  See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008) (link); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a) (link). 
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riods are (like the rule against perpetuities) inflexible67 further evidences 
how intricately the ―dilemma of time‖ is manifest in the law. 
The exceptional case of murder—as to which no statute of limitations 
can be said to run—further captures the enigma.  The law retrieves a body 
and identifies it, but cannot find the killer.  The more difficult the case, the 
more everyone wants to know, ―Who did it?  How was it done?  What was 
the plan of accomplishment and the plan of escape?‖  We want to know that 
which compels us to turn the pages of the murder mystery: the ―seven gol-
den Ws‖ of ―What?  Who?  When?  Where?  In what way?  What with?  
Why?‖68  Everyone likens himself to the murderer, however implausibly or 
impossibly.  To disprove the likeness, society requires that the murder be 
solved, regardless of the passage of time.69  Just as we read through the 
night, regardless of the hour, so the law continues to search, forever.  From 
whence does this compulsion to know, to be apprised of the facts despite 
the constraint of empirical time and its passage, come?  Perhaps when he 
says that the law‘s capacity to analogize different persons as alike runs 
through everything, Holmes goes a long way in providing the answer.  As 
the pregnant step into the shoes of the barren, the heir into the shoes of the 
predecessor, the fee holder into the shoes of the trespasser, so everyone 
steps into the shoes of the murderer.  The murder must be solved, regardless 
of time, because only by ascertaining the details and comparing them to 
what we know of our own circumstances at that same time, date and place, 
can we begin to rule ourselves out as the murderer; when the crime is 
solved, we can know for sure.70 
The conundrum of time is not a phenomenon of the common law 
alone.  In arguing the case for constitutional supremacy in The Federalist, 
Hamilton begins by acknowledging that the deference to what comes earlier 





  Where the purpose of the limitations period is not to protect the body of the person from futuristic 
intrusions, but ―to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of 
claims,‖ it is deemed truly ―jurisdictional.‖  John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 128 S. Ct. at 153.  As such, it 
concerns not the person of the defendant but the subject matter of the claim itself.  Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007) (link). 
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  THEODOR REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS: ON THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 8 (Farrar, Straus, & Cudahy 1959). 
69
  Cf. Richard P. Conti, The Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & 
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to the natural order of things.71  Where ―two statutes existing at one time[] 
clash[],‖ he observes, ―the last in order of time shall be preferred to the 
first.‖72  This consequence—that amongst ―interfering acts of an equal au-
thority, that which was the last indication of its will should have the prefe-
rence‖—is not ―derived from any positive law.‖73  It follows, rather, from 
―the nature and reason of the thing‖: time itself flows forward.  Only in the 
exceptional instance where the earlier act is of higher authority, as is the 
case with the Constitution, should the natural order be reversed and the path 
of the law arrested in favor of precedent‘s dead hand, freezing everything in 
time and place.  For all his unwavering commitment to this reversal, on 
which he says the theory of every written constitution must hinge, even 
John Marshall understood that in the natural course of things time is forever 
hurrying along and away from us, that ―[t]he past cannot be recalled by the 
most absolute power,‖ and that the law—the might of precedent notwith-
standing—is powerless to change this truism.74  
A. Identity and Difference 
In affirming that analogy ―as a friend‖75 entails ―choice,‖76 Schauer ta-
citly acknowledges that by the process of analogy, by likening one thing to 
another, the law moves forward in time—and he concurs with Hamilton 
that this is reasonable.  When he goes on to say that precedent is about 
―constraining,‖ and is typified by a ―lack of freedom,‖77 what he has in 
mind is the strict obligation to follow a prior decision, to ―stand by what has 
been decided,‖78 stare decisis, right or wrong.  As Kant once said with great 
opprobrium, ―Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only 
obey!‖79  This determination to look backward, to defer to what has been, to 
succeed to what reason may presently tell the judge to be wrong, however 
enlightened he may otherwise be, is what Schauer questions when he sug-
gests that to follow precedent may be an act of non-reason.  His argument, 
however, has nothing to do with time, and everything to do with logic.  If 
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to that.  There is no play in the joint of sheer identity (A=A).  As a conse-
quence, diversity of any shape or stripe is precluded ab initio, a priori.  
Schauer acknowledges that the analogical creation of likenesses and the 
precedential identification of sameness both begin with an initial act of 
comparison, ―but from there the paths diverge.‖80  Using analogy, all sorts 
of things can be made alike.  Analogues are similar; they are proportional 
and differ only by degree.81  A system of precedent is, by contrast, digital.82  
Either two legal situations are the same, which is to say acknowledged as 
identical, or they are different, which is to say excluded from coverage by 
existing law.  Analogy is consistent with freedom and choice, whereas 
precedent only obliges.  In this vein, Schauer goes on to speculate that 
people with a ―broader scope of imagination and creativity will . . . see ana-
logical opportunities where others see only precedential constraint.‖83 
Schauer‘s criticism of precedent as a ―foe‖84 to reason is reminiscent of 
Hegel‘s famous attack on the so-called philosophy of identity extant in his 
time.  Just as Hegel likens thinking that demands that diverse things be 
deemed identical to the night in which all cows are black,85 Schauer‘s 
precedent-bound jurist is like the ―Vermont justice of the peace‖ who dis-
missed a claim for a broken churn because ―he had looked through the sta-
tutes and could find nothing about churns.‖86  This kind of black-and-white 
thinking gives credence to Schauer‘s assertion that ―introductory logic texts 
often describe arguments from precedent as logical fallacies.‖87  So Hegel 
assails the proposition A=A as a contradiction, a formulaic identity of terms 
that belies the actual difference between things; and Leibniz insists that 
―there are never in nature two things which are perfectly alike and between 
which it is not possible to find an inward difference.‖88  To prove the point, 
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leaves in a garden.‖89  The gentleman failed—just as the Vermont justice 
failed to find anything on all fours with churns in the statute books.  Yet for 
every simpleton vainly seeking identity, there is a sophisticate profitably 
claiming likeness, a Brandeis expounding the ―Law of Ponds‖ by likening it 
to other laws that are not identical, but analogous in one way or another.90  
Although the theory of identity on which precedent relies precludes any 
such thing as ―churn law,‖ the corollary fact that nothing either in heaven or 
earth is reducible to an ―either-or,‖91 that everything so diverse in nature can 
be related through reason, be seen to be alike in some fashion or other, al-
lows for the possibility that there indeed can be such a thing as churn law—
for better or for worse. 
No less an authority than Aristotle cautioned about the danger of en-
demic likeness when he instructed: if reason is let alone to make analogies 
at its pleasure, ―an infinity of specifically different things‖ will all be 
deemed alike.92  The proliferation of such novelties as Pond Law, Tree Law, 
Art Law, even Horse Law proves this ―infinite connectedness of grounds 
with what is grounded.‖93 
Schauer is of the opinion that the law can harness and control, in a 
principled fashion, reason‘s profligate appetite for likenesses, its propensity 
to analogize amongst different things.  Believe him if you will.94  Yet impli-
cit in the apt characterization of the law as a seamless web is the under-
standing that the likenesses with which it is woven, the grounds it 
ceaselessly demands and provides, are interchangeable.  Explaining that a 
correct ―perception of similarities and dissimilars‖ is the ―one thing that 
cannot be taught‖ and also ―a sign of genius,‖ Aristotle asserts that ―the 
greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor.‖95  Small wonder that at 
the very beginning of his Elements of the Philosophy of Right Hegel takes 
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Penelope‘s ―web‖ of likenesses, ―which must be begun afresh every morn-
ing.‖96   
B. Reason and Necessity 
More to our point is John Marshall‘s accolade of the written constitu-
tion as that with which everything must be strictly identified (A=A).  Like 
the unyielding precedents to which Hamilton‘s common law jurists are 
strictly bound,97 the document identifies the constitutional right and duty in 
every instance, stare decisis, no questions asked.  As cherished as originali-
ty, creativity, and imagination may be for the analogical thinker aspiring to 
devise ingenious relations between diverse things, so they are despised 
when it comes to ―fundamental law.‖  Schelling, Marshall‘s early nine-
teenth-century contemporary in Germany, said it as well as anyone in as-
serting that a judge who decides by ―looking into the heart of things‖ to see 
for himself what they are truly like, what they should and should not be li-
kened unto, ―presents the most unworthy and revolting spectacle that can 
exist for anyone imbued with feeling for the holiness of the law.‖98  Mar-
shall makes no apology for the fact that constitutional law is nothing but an 
elementary match game, a black-and-white matter of included identity or 
excluded difference.  Just compare the challenged act to the constitutional 
text.  If they match, then all is well and good; but if there is a difference, if 
the act proves ―repugnant‖ to the Constitution, it is void.  Any other result 
would be ―absurd,‖ would ―subvert the very foundation of all written con-
stitutions,‖ and ―reduce[]‖ it ―to nothing.‖99  Following in this train, Justice 
Antonin Scalia—in reference to reproductive freedom—readily concedes 
that women, like everyone else, have ―‗liberty‘ in the absolute sense.‖100  
The only problem is that such ―liberty simpliciter‖ cannot be identified an-
ywhere in the Constitution.101  Likewise, when Justice Clarence Thomas 
dissents from the Lawrence Court‘s likening of constitutional liberty to 
transcendence, it is because he cannot find ―transcendence‖ mentioned an-
ywhere in the constitution.102  In these instances, the fact that there is no 
constitutional law of transcendence or absolute freedom does mean that (ab-
sent amendment) no such constitutional law can ever come to be.  As ana-
logous as they may appear, the ―rights of man‖ are not synonymous with, 
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Admittedly Scalia, Thomas, and Bork are associated with an extreme 
view of constitutional propriety.  Still, no one is endorsing the notion that 
the practice of law be reduced to Hegel‘s ―infinite connectedness of 
grounds.‖  Lawyers and judges all are committed to the proliferation and 
enforcement of ―those wise restraints that make men free.‖  Schauer‘s sug-
gestion that precedent (in the sense of stare decisis) is synonymous with 
constraint as the inevitable precipitate of identity (A=A), and that analogy is 
synonymous with freedom as the consequence of difference (A is like B), 
offers a helpful new way to frame and to understand the debate over just 
what constitutional allegiance entails.  His further suggestion that the under-
lying tension is between reason and non-reason further advances the ball 
only if we understand non-reason not as something pejorative, but in a neu-
tral way, as something other, simply different than reason.  This is precise-
ly, I suggest, what Montesquieu had in mind in insisting that the spirit of 
the laws has nothing to do with the laws themselves, but ―consists in the 
various relations that laws can have with various things,‖104 and it is also 
what Hamilton means in asserting that ―[t]he interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.‖105  That Hamilton ac-
tually means what he says—that a right is inherently attributable to the 
place and not the person (as we have come to believe)—is consistent with 
his insistence that the courthouse, ―being the immediate and visible guar-
dian of life and property,‖ is ―the great cement of society,‖ the ―most attrac-
tive source of popular obedience and attachment,‖ and a symbol of the 
people‘s ―affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.‖106 
As improbably as Moses once disappeared into a mountain and reap-
peared with words chiseled onto rock successfully commanding people to 
adhere and to obey, Schauer‘s precedent, or stare decisis, demands and 
achieves absolute fealty, the dictates of reason notwithstanding.  In the face 
of precedent reason declares thou shalt not reason.  Although a committed 
dialectician, which is to say aspiring master of metaphor and unrepentant 
idolater of reason, may rue the fact that the law has not yet proved itself ca-
pable of advancing beyond rote deference to ―the thing decided‖ and pre-
scribed on the Tablets,107 the Founders recognized that there is something 
other than reason in this world; thankfully, they provided for it when they 
set our constitutional sails.  As the ancients were informed of that other 
something in their practice of burying the dead hand of the suicide victim as 
far away as possible from the rest of his body (lest it return and, like some 
springing future interest, suddenly come back to life to strike another mortal 
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consecrate the dead hand of precedent.  In so doing, they protect against the 
dead hand‘s no less dangerous analogue—the rule of reason—whose 
process of ―like recognized by like‖ allows for even the most unlikely of 
things to be deemed alike.  
CONCLUSION 
If I am right that a mighty armada is setting its sails to impose an em-
pirical order on a constitution that relies on something else108 to secure the 
―Blessings of Liberty‖109 in perpetuity, Schauer‘s complicity is particularly 
dangerous.  If, as John Marshall insists, adaptation to ―exigencies‖ that can-
not be ―foreseen,‖ and ―which can be best provided for as they occur ―is the 
only chance our Constitution has ―to endure for ages to come,‖110 and to 
prevail as the fittest amongst all the competing species of government, 
Schauer‘s proposition that we design ways for selecting lawyers and judges 
who lack ―creativity‖ and ―imagination,‖111 and who are constitutionally 
predisposed to a ―noncreative‖ and ―narrower‖ way of seeing112 is stunning-
ly obtuse; and his reckless insistence on playing the high-stakes game of 
coercion versus freedom borders on the irresponsible.  Whether wise re-
straints make men free and how, or whether  ―freedom‖ is ―completely in-
compatible with system‖ and must ―end up with the denial of freedom‖ are 
the fundamental questions that any theory of law must ponder.113  The start-
ing point for this reflection is not, as Schauer suggests, to enlist the merce-
nary assistance of ―psychologists‖ who are ―trained to perform‖ 
experiments about liberty and restraint,114 but to recognize that freedom and 
necessity are not separate and distinct quanta, but are and will forever re-
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